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AIRPORT NOISE REGULATION: BURBANK, AARON, 
AND AIR TRANSPORT 
Mary Lee Warren * 
"The aircraft and its noise are indivisible. "1 
Noise has been an unfortunate by-product of air transportation 
since its earliest days. One can humorously imagine an assistant on 
the sands at Kitty Hawk in 1903 with fingers poked in his ears 
screeching to be heard above the racket of a flimsy propeller. The 
growth of the air-transport industry and the development of sub-
and supersonic jetcraft have deafeningly increased and compounded 
aircraft noise. Large urban airports have so concentrated that noise 
as to threaten public health and environmental balance within a 
wide radius of the airport. 
Attempts to abate the noise at airports have been halting and 
generally ineffective. One reason for this failure has been the legal 
uncertainty concerning whether the federal, as opposed to state and 
local, government has the power to control airport noise. This article 
will review three court challenges of California airport noise regula-
tion and fiscal responsibility, as well as the lack of federal agency 
initiative, in an attempt to ascertain where that control now rests. 
The first of these cases is City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Ter-
minal, Inc., 2 in which the United States Supreme Court struck down 
a municipal ordinance enacted to abate local airport noise and de-
clared that the Federal Aviation Act of 1958,3 the Noise Abatement 
Amendments of 1968,4 and the Noise Control Act of 19725 together 
established an instance of federal preemption over "airspace man-
agement."8 Burbank, however, was not a definitive resolution of the 
• Staff Member, ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS. 
1 American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 272 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.n.N.Y. 1967), 
aff'd, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969). 
2 411 U.S. 624 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Burbank.] 
3 49 U.S.C. §§1301 et seq. (1970). 
• 49 U.S.C. §1431 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973). 
5 42 U.S.C. §§4901 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973) and 49 U.S.C. §1431 (Supp. III, 1973). 
• City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 627 (1973). 
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allocation of the power to control noise. The rationale was founded 
on ambiguous legislative history and the holding provided a massive 
exemption for possible local control where framed as proprietary, 
rather than police power, restrictions. 
Next, Aaron v. City of Los Angeles7 struck a financial blow to 
municipal proprietors of airports which had not been foreseen after 
Burbank. The shift of control of noise from traditionally local to 
federal government regulation should logically be accompanied by 
a parallel shift to the federal government of fiscal liability for dam-
ages caused by noise pollution.s Aaron, however, held that the fiscal 
liability continued with the local government and consequently fur-
ther defined the Burbank proprietary exception. 
Considering the proprietary control exception of Burbank and the 
consequent fiscal liability of Aaron, as well as the continuing lack 
of federal regulation or enforcement of airport noise control, a three-
judge federal district court recently held in Air Transport Associa-
tion of America v. Crottie that certain state suggestions for local 
airport owner-operator regulation of noise were not per se invalid. 
The opinion expressly withheld final decision on the yet to be ap-
plied regulations, but it marked the first positive affirmation oflocal 
control of airport noise after Burbank. 
I. FEDERAL PREEMPTION OF AIRSPACE MANAGEMENT: CITY OF 
BURBANK v. LOCKHEED AIR TERMINAL, INC. 
In 1970 the Burbank City Council enacted a curfew ordinance 
which made unlawful jet take-off's from Hollywood-Burbank Airport 
between 11 p.m. and 7 a.m .. l0 Airport noise had been widely recog-
nized as most annoying during these nighttime hours,11 and the 
curfew was expressed as an exercise of the city's police power to 
protect and preserve the public health. In fact, only one flight per 
week - an intrastate flight Sunday nights at 11:30 p.m. - was 
7 40 Cal. App.3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) 
[hereinafter cited as Aaron]. 
• EPA to Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., Report on Aircraft-Airport 
Noise 56-62 (Comm. Print 1973) and W. LAKE, Noise: Emerging Federal Control in Federal 
Environmental Law 1150 (Environmental Law Institute, 1974); Note, Federal Regulation of 
Aircraft Noise Under Federal Aviation Act, 15 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 848 (1974); Note, 
Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is There Room for Local Regulation? 60 CORNELL L. REV. 269 
(1975). 
• 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D.Cal. 1975) [hereinafter cited as Air Transport]. 
10 Burbank, Cal., Municipal Code §20-32.1 (1970). The ordinance allowed an exception 
from the curfew restriction for emergency flights authorized by the Burbank police. 
\I For a survey of noise pollution health studies see Comment, Toward The Comprehensive 
Abatement of Noise Pollution: Recent Federal and New York City Noise Control Legislation, 
4 ECOL. L.Q. 109, 110-14 (1974). 
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affected. Although the municipal restriction was framed cautiously 
in terms of airport and not air flight control, both airport and air-
craft operators could be held responsible for violations. 
The airport owner and the affected airline challenged the consti-
tutional validity of the city's curfew in federal district court.12 The 
court found the ordinance unconstitutional under the Supremacy 
and Commerce Clauses of the United States Constitution.13 On ap-
peal the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed under the Su-
premacy Clause on grounds of federal preemption and conflict. 14 On 
final appeal, the United States Supreme Court affirmed on grounds 
of preemption alone. 15 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958,18 the Noise 
Abatement Amendments of 1968,17 and the Noise Control Act of 
197218 were cited as evidencing "complete and exclusive" federal 
sovereignty over "airspace management."19 
The Supreme Court holding had been foreshadowed by a series 
of federal and state court cases. In Allegheny Airlines, Inc. v. Village 
of Cedarhurst,20 a local ordinance setting minimum altitude over-
flights for aircraft using nearby John F. Kennedy Airport in New 
York was held invalid by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, 
which found that the area of navigable airspace had been federally 
preempted to the exclusion of other regulation. In Loma Portal Civic 
Club v. American Airlines, Inc.,21 an injunction sought by a group 
of property owners to eliminate certain flights at a neighboring air-
port was denied. The California Supreme Court relied on 
Cedarhurst but narrowed its theory of invalidity from preemption 
to specific conflict with federal regulation of aviation. In American 
Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 22 a town's "unnecessary noise" 
ordinance was held invalid, again by the Second Circuit, as a thinly-
veiled attempt to impermissibly regulate aircraft flight in conflict 
12 The Air Transport Association, whose membership includes all nationally certified car-
riers, intervened as a plaintiff. The Federal Aviation Administration filed an amicus brief in 
support of the plaintiff and the State of California filed an amicus brief in support of the 
defendant municipality. 
13 318 F. Supp. 914 (C.D. Cal. 1970). Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2. 
Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
II 457 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1972). 
" 411 U.S. 624 (1973), Douglas, J., writing for a 5-member majority. 
" 49 U.S.C. §§ 1301 et seq. (1970). 
17 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4901 et seq. (Supp. III, 1973) and 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (Supp. III, 1973), 
amending 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (1970). 
18 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1973). 
'" 238 F.2d 812 (2d Cir. 1956). 
21 61 Cal.2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964). 
22 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1017 (1969). 
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with Federal Aviation Agency landing and take-off regulations for 
Kennedy Airport.23 The court relied on Lama for the theory of spe-
cific conflict, although it indicated broader preemption might have 
also been found. More recently, in an advisory opinion,24 the Massa-
chusetts Supreme Judicial Court cautioned the state legislature 
that a proposed enactment banning supersonic transports from 
landing in the Commonwealth would be an unconstitutional en-
croachment in the federally preempted area of aircraft flight. The 
court added parenthetically that some limited regulations might be 
permissible when the state or local agency was acting as airport 
proprietor. 
Not all local ordinances regulating airport or air flight manage-
ment to control noise, however, had been invalidated. In some cases, 
a federal preemption was not found. In such cases, if the local regu-
lation was reasonable and it did not conflict with any existing fed-
eral law, rule, or regulation, it was allowed to stand. For example, 
in Stagg v. Municipal Court,25 the enactment of a night curfew at 
the Santa Monica Municipal Airport was held by the California 
Court of Appeals to be a valid exercise of the city's police power 
which was not in conflict with any state or federal legislation. And 
in Port of New York Authority v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc.,26 the 
federal district court held that the metropolitan authority's scheme 
of preferential runway use to abate jet aircraft noise at La Guardia 
Airport was reasonable and did not infringe upon a federally 
preempted area of regulation. 27 
Given this background, Burbank appeared to settle the uncer-
tainties of local jurisdiction to control airport noise pollution. The 
Supreme Court found a federal preemption of "airspace manage-
ment." The Federal Aviation Act of 1958 was held to have estab-
23 The District Court below had declared: 
The aircraft and its noise are indivisible; the noise of the aircraft extends outward from it 
with the same inseparability as its wings and tail assembly; to exclude the aircraft noise 
from the Town is to exclude the aircraft; to set a ground level decibel limit for the aircraft 
is directly to exclude it from the lower air that it cannot use without exceeding the decibel 
limit. . . . In a word, the Ordinance does not forbid noise except by forbidding flights and 
it is, therefore, the legal equivalent of the invalid Cedarhurst Ordinance. 
272 F. Supp. 226, 230 (E.D.N.Y. 1967). 
" Opinion of the Justices, 359 Mass. 778, 271 N.E.2d 354 (1971). 
25 2 Cal. App.3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1969). 
,. 259 F. Supp. 745 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). 
21 Other examples include Aircraft Owners & Pilots Ass'n v. Port Authority, 305 F. Supp. 
93 (E.D.N.Y. 1969); Williams v. Superior Court, 108 Ariz. 154, 494 P.2d 26 (1972); and 
Parachutes, Inc. v. Township of Lakewood, 121 N.J. Super. 48,296 A.2d 71 (Super. Ct. 1972), 
certification denied, 62 N.J. 331 (1973). 
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lished "complete and exclusive national sovereignty"28 of the air-
space of the United States.29 This federal primacy, the Court be-
lieved, was emphatically ratified by the Noise Control Act of 1972, 
which had been passed since the lower court rulings in Burbank: 
"That Act reaffirms and reinforces the conclusion that FAA, now in 
conjunction with EPA, has full control over aircraft noise, pre-
empting state and local control."30 
A. The Preemption Finding 
The Court initially recognized that no express language of 
preemption could be found in the Noise Control Act and that a 
strong presumption existed that the control of noise, which had 
traditionally been exercised within the powers of states, would re-
main with the states.3! The Supreme Court, in Rice v. Santa Fe 
Elevator Corp., 32 however, had stated that when Congressional in-
tent was manifest and clear, evidenced by the pervasiveness of fed-
eral regulation in the area, this presumption could be overcome and 
preemption could be found. 33 The Burbank Court illustrated the 
pervasiveness of federal regulation of air traffic by quoting from 
Justice Jackson's concurrence in Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. 
Minnesota: 
Federal control is intensive and exclusive. Planes do not wander about 
in the sky like vagrant clouds. They move only by federal permission, 
subject to federal inspection, in the hands of federally certified person-
nel and under an intricate system of federal commands. The moment a 
ship taxis onto a runway it is caught up in an elaborate and detailed 
system of controls.34 
,. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 626-27 (1973). 
" 49 U.S.C. § 1508 (1970). Airspace which was termed "navigable" by the Federal Aviation 
Act included airport approach and take-off paths, 49 U.S.C.A. § 1301 (26) (Supp. 1975). 
30 411 U.S. 624, 633 (1973). 
31 [d. This presumption against preemption of a power traditionally held by the states was 
declared by the Court in San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959) 
to be basic to a form of government founded on a concept of Federalism. 
32 311 U.S. 218 (1947) . 
.. [d. at 230. The "clear and manifest purpose of Congress" could be shown by: 1) the 
pervasiveness of the federal regulatory scheme, 2) the dominance of federal interest in the 
area, 3) the objectives of the federal law which imply a uniform system of regulation, and 4) 
the objectives of the federal law which preclude state or local inconsistencies. These four 
instances broadened the traditional preemption rule which had been declared in Cooley v. 
Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143, 152 (1851). The Cooley rule states that the "nature" 
of the area of regulation is determinative. If the area admits to only one source of control, 
preemption may be inferred, but if similar controls can be exercised by various levels of 
government, preemption may not be found unless explicitly stated in the regulatory legisla-
tion. 
3. 322 U.S. 292, 303 (1944), quoted in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 
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The Court recounted a legislative history of the 1968 Noise Abate-
ment Amendments to the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Con-
trol Act of 1972 to evidence pervasiveness and resultant Congres-
sional intent to preempt state and local government police power 
controls. Included were portions of a written opinion of the Secre-
tary of Transportation about the 1968 Amendments,35 the unen-
acted Senate version of the 1972 Act,36 arguments from the floor of 
Congress urging enactment,37 and a statement of the President at 
the signing of the bill. 38 
Despite the recital of legislative history, the Supreme Court in 
fact appeared to rely on actual agency behavior and practical func-
tioning to evince the "clear and manifest" purpose of Congress to 
preempt the area. The Court announced that the procedures under 
the 1972 Act were already well under way, noting certain regulations 
which had already been promulgated and Federal Aviation Agency 
[FAA] notices that others were soon to be issued.3D Practical func-
tioning of aircraft control under the Federal Aviation Act further 
explained the preemption requirement: 
The Federal Aviation Act requires a delicate balance between safety and 
efficiency 49 U.S.C. §1348 (a), and the protection of persons on the 
ground. 49 U.S.C. §1348 (c) .... The interdependence of these factors 
requires a uniform and exclusive system of federal regulation if the 
congressional objectives underlying the Federal Aviation Act are to be 
fulfilled. 40 
The Supreme Court chose to rely on the broad constitutional 
ground of federal preemption and not the narrower or more explicit 
grounds of direct conflict with federal law41 or undue burden on 
U.S. 624, 633-34 (1973). 
35 Hea~ings on S. 707 and H. R. 3400 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1968). 
" S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1968). 
37 118 CONGo BEc. 37083 (1972) (remarks of Representative Staggers, D-W. Va.) and 118 
CONGo REC. 37317 (1972) (remarks of Senator Tunney, D-Ca!.). 
311 8 WEEKLY COMPo PRES. Docs. 1583 (1972). 
30 The FAA issued a series of advance notices of proposed rulemaking which were to require 
entire fleet compliance with 14 C.F.R§§36 et seq. (1975) [FAR 36] aircraft noise levels by 
July, 1978 in 35 Fed. Reg. 16980 (1970), in 38 Fed. Reg. 2769 (1973), and, after Burbank, 
supra, note 2, in 39 Fed. Reg. 11302 (1974). None of these proposed regulations has, in fact, 
been promulgated . 
.. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 638-39 (1973). 
" E.g .. , Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973), which allowed 
state regulation of sea-to-shore oil spill pollution unless a clear conflict with federal water 
quality legislation could be shown; Florida Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. V. Paul, 373 U.S. 
132 (1963) which limited review to actual rather than hypothetical state conflicts with federal 
agricultural standards; and Huron Portland Cement CO. V. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 
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interstate commerce.42 Even though Commerce Clause implications 
were introduced in a suggestion that the Burbank ordinance and 
similar ordinances of other municipalities would "fractionalize" any 
regulatory scheme and thus "severely limit the flexibility of the 
FAA in controlling air traffic flow .... "43 the Court's ground for 
invalidation was solely the existence of a federal preemption. 
The finding of preemption continued a trend of Supreme Court 
decisions and represented a particular kind ofjudiciallaw-making.44 
When the Court determines Congress intended by its legislation 
complete and exclusive federal regulation of a particular field, 
preemption, based on the Supremacy Clause, is declared. 45 The 
Court's review is limited to flat determinations of intent evidenced 
in legislative language, history, or administrative behavior. There is 
no delicate balancing of burdens and interests as in Commerce 
Clause cases. 4ft There is no factual finding of "direct and positive" 
inconsistency of state law with federal law as in conflict cases.47 
A finding of preemption tends to be a perfunctory constitutional 
decision. It is analogous to the Court's practice of deciding a case 
on other than constitutional grounds if at all possible. 48 Thus, 
preemption allows the Court to postpone decisions on what might 
be difficult or close questions of law. In Burbank, for example, ten-
(1960) which held a city air pollution ordinance sanctioning ship smoke stack emissions valid 
because it did not directly conflict with the federal navigation licensing scheme. 
" E.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959), which invalidated a state 
statute requiring a peculiar type of mudguard on trucks using state highways as unduly 
burdensome on interstate commerce; Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona ex reI. Sullivan, 325 
U.S. 761 (1945), which struck down a state law limiting train length as obstructive to the free 
flow of interstate commerce; and South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 
U.S. 177 (1938), which allowed state regulation of the width of trucks using its highways as 
not unduly restrictive of interstate commerce . 
.. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973). Rehnquist, 
J., writing in dissent abruptly dismissed any question of undue burden on interstate com-
merce by first stressing that commerce clause implications should be considered case-by-case 
and not by illusive hypotheticals and by then noting that only one flight per week was af-
fected in this instance. 411 U.S. 624, 654 (1973) . 
.. For a general discussion of this trend see Hirsch, Toward a New View of Federal 
Preemption, 1972 U. ILL. L.F. 515; Note, Pre-Emption as a Preferential Ground: A New 
Canon of Construction, 12 STAN. L. REV. 208 (1959). 
" U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 reads: "This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States 
which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ... shall be the supreme Law of the Land .... " 
.. Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959); Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona 
ex rel. Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761 (1945). 
47 Askew v. American Waterways Operators, Inc., 411 U.S. 325 (1973); Kelly v. Washington 
ex rel. Foss Co .. 302 U.S. 1, 10 (1937) . 
.. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 346 (1936)(concurring opinion); 
Burton v. United States, 196 U.S. 283, 295 (1905). 
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uous Commerce Clause implications of local regulation of aircraft 
have been cautiously deferred by the preemption finding. Tacti-
cally, preemption puts Congress on notice that a certain area will 
be exclusively federally regulated unless it acts to amend the ques-
tionable legislation which had been reviewed by the Court. Thus, 
Congress, and not the Court, is in the position of invalidating state 
or local law and criticisms of judicial legislating are neatly parried. 
Unlike a finding of direct conflict which is narrow and factual, a 
finding of preemption is broad and presumptive. Consequently, it 
may present certain disadvantages or dangers. Only limited federal 
regulation of a particular area may exist and many opportunities for 
non-conflicting or even reinforcing state and local regulations may 
be offered. These opportunities remain open if the court finds only 
conflict, but they are abruptly foreclosed if it finds preemption. In 
the case of preemption, until federal regulations are promulgated or 
until Congress amends the original legislation, there may be an 
absence of rules, standards, and enforcement in an area now immu-
nized from state and local control. The result is confusion and un-
certainty, at best. The developments since Burbank tend to confirm 
the dangers of choosing preemption as grounds for invalidation. 
B. The "Flaws" of the Burbank Decision 
Two major flaws in the reasoning of the Burbank decision have 
become increasingly apparent since its pronouncement in 1973 by 
the Supreme Court: (1) the stated reliance on legislative history as 
the basis for a preemption finding and (2) the stated limited applic-
ability of the decision to municipalities (or state government agen-
cies) in their exercise of police power over local airports to control 
noise. 
The legislative history cited by the majority of the Court was 
ambiguous, and failed to establish a solid and clear Congressional 
intent and purpose. 49 For each cite offered, Justice Rehnquist, dis-
senting, countered with authority that the Congressional intent was 
not to disturb the existing federal, state, and local governments 
balance of power.50 The majority's evidence of preemptive intent 
4. E.g., the use of statements by Senator Tunney (D.-Cal.) and Representative Staggers 
(D.-W.Va.) to establish Congressional intent. Supra, note 37. Statements made from the floor 
of Congress generally are not viewed as reliable indicators of intent and are often discounted 
as mere grandstanding. City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc. 411 U.S. 624, 642 
n.l (1973) (dissenting opinion). 
50 Cited authority included inter alia: statements of Congressional intent in H.R. REP. No. 
842, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 8 (1972) and S. REp. No. 1160, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 10-11 (1972) that 
the Noise Control Act of 1972 was not to alter existing federal, state and local regulatory 
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was particularly weak given the established standard that such in-
tent has to be strong and persuasive in order to overcome the his-
toric presumption of the validity of state and local police power 
regula tions. 51 
The applicability of Burbank was limited in the often-cited note 
14 to a municipality's exercise of its police power to control local 
airport noise. The decision expressly does not concern a municipal-
ity's exercise of its proprietary rights as owner and operator of the 
airport.52 In fact, the Hollywood-Burbank Airport is an anomaly; it 
is the only major national airport which is privately owned. But the 
holding of Burbank does not singly apply to that airport. It would 
also be determinative in those instances of one municipality's 
attempt to control noise at a neighboring municipality's airport.53 
There have been a few attempts to exercise such police powers sub-
sequent to Burbank.54 Yet in most cases the municipality or other 
governmental unit is the owner and operator of the local airport and 
therefore is not expressly prevented by Burbank from exercising its 
proprietary rights by regulating noise levels. 
powers; statements by the sponsor of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 in Hearings on S. 3880 
Before a Subcomm. of the Sen. Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 85th Cong., 2d 
Sess. 279 (1958); and statements made in support of the 1968 Noise Abatement Amendments 
in H. R. REP. No. 1463, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1968) and in S. REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 
2d Sess. 2-3, 6-7 (1968). City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 641-
50 (1973) (dissenting opinion). 
" San Diego Bldg. Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 243 (1959). 
" City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 635 n.14 (1973). The note 
includes an excerpt from a letter of the Sec'y of Transportation which appears in full in 
Hearings on S. 707 and H.R. 3400 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the Senate Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 62 (1968): 
[T)he proposed legislation [Noise Abatement Amendments of 1968) will not affect the 
rights of a state or local public agency, as the proprietor of an airport . .. (original em-
phasis). 
and the Court's own explication: 
[W)e are concerned here not with an ordinance imposed by the City of Burbank as 
"proprietor" of the airport, but with the exercise of police power .... We do not consider 
here what limits, if any, apply to a municipality as a proprietor. 
03 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 635-36 n.14 (1973). E.g., 
American Airlines, Inc. v. Town of Hempstead, 398 F.2d 369 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 
U.S. 1017 (1969). The Court illustrated an extreme of this circumstance with the example of 
Cincinnati's airport which is located not merely in another city but in another state, Ken-
tucky. 
" The following cases relied on the Burbank declared federal preemption to invalidate one 
community's attempt to control the noise of another community's airport: Village of Bensen-
ville v. City of Chicago, 16 Ill. App. 3d 733, 306 N.E.2d 562 (1973) denied an attempt by a 
group of contiguous municipalities to prevent increased noise pollution incumbent with the 
proposed expansion of O'Hare Int'l Airport; Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 
135 N.J. Super. 529, 343 A.2d 792 (Super. Ct. 1975) vacated a prior decision to enjoin certain 
jet flights at a town's airport which had been sought by the neighboring township. 
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If the great bulk of airport noise cases are not to be affected, 
however, the rationale of Burbank is defeated. Basic to the Burbank 
holding is "[t]he interdependence of [safety, efficiency and the 
protection of persons on the ground which] requires a uniform and 
exclusive system of federal regulation. . . ."55 If this requirement of 
uniformity exists, it should make no difference whether the local 
regulation is based on the state's police power or the owner's pro-
prietary power. 56 
The dichotomy creates a senseless contradiction unless it may be 
viewed as a restriction on a kind of action rather than on a category 
of airport ownership. A municipality which owns and operates an 
airport, in effect, may play two roles in the control of noise pollu-
tion. One role is manifested in the exercise of its police power to 
protect the local citizenry, by such techniques as setting altitude 
minimums and prescribing stringent take-off and touchdown opera-
tional proceduresY The other approach involves the exercise of the 
municipality's fundamental proprietary rights in terms of land and 
facilities use, equivalent to those of any individual or corporation, 
such as terminal and facilities leasing, take-off and landing fee lev-
ies and expansion and development plans. 
The municipality's police power flows from the Tenth Amend-
ment and from the local government's equivalent of a constitution, 
perhaps a city charter or incorporation document.58 This power is 
exercised to protect and preserve the public health, welfare, and 
safety and is often enforced and sanctioned by criminal action. On 
the other hand, the municipality's proprietary power generally does 
not have a legislative base but is "a common-law right which in-
heres to the owner and operator of the land."5D Proprietary restric-
tions are exercised to protect and benefit the owner and are enforced 
through civil proceedings. 
55 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 639 (1973). 
51 Also consider that the Supreme Court does not note probable jurisdiction to hear a case 
unless an issue with general impact or national significance is presented. Yet if the extreme 
limitation of note 14 is taken literally, Burbank becomes a decision of nearly unique applica-
tion. 
" For a general discussion of operational techniques to abate airport noise, see Comment, 
Port Noise Complaint, 6 HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 61 (1970) . 
•• State v. Whitaker, 228 N.C. 352, 359, 45 S.E.2d 860, 865 (1947), aff'd, 335 U.S. 525 
(1949). 
51 Testim~ny of S. Goldstein of the Port of New York Authority in Hearings Pursuant to 
H. R. Res. 420 Before Subcomm. on the Study of Airport Noise of the House Comm. on 
Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 87th Cong., 2d Sess. 657 (1962). See also Port of New York 
Authority v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 259 F. Supp. 745, 750 (E.n.N.Y. 1966) for statement of 
airport owner's right to enforce restrictive covenant of airport-airline lease to require preferen-
tial runway use to reduce noise. 
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The nature of control of noise through the municipality's police 
power flight restrictions, and not through proprietary leasing or con-
tracting, is the legislative area which can". . . admit only of one 
uniform system, or plan of regulation .... " in the terms of the 
traditional preemption rule. 80 This type of control is to be provided 
solely by the FAA and EPA and is thus federally preempted. 
Even this conciliatory reading of the Burbank rationale with its 
exceptional limitation prompts more questions than it answers. 
What are the contours and limits of these two roles of a local 
government? Don't they often overlap?81 Between the FAA and the 
municipal proprietor of an airport, who is to control and who is to 
enforce which noise restrictions? And finally, who is to bear the 
responsibility for non-control and non-enforcement? 
In Burbank a general rule was stated: local police power attempts 
to control airport noise were invalid because the area of airspace 
management had been federally preempted. But the precision of the 
rule's dimensions and the nuances of its possible implications were 
far from clear. 
II. INVERSE CONDEMNATION: AARON V. CITY OF Los ANGELES 
Local government police power legislation is not the only means 
available to attempt to abate airport noise pollution. Private indi-
viduals can seek property damage recoveries from the airport owner-
operator and thus may spur other local attempts to lower noise 
levels to avoid future liability. In January, 1975, the United States 
Supreme Court denied certiorari in one such private propertyac-
tion, Aaron v. City of Los Angeles.82 The Court left standing a Cali-
fornia Court of Appeals decision which held the city fiscally liable 
to its airport's neighbors for damages in reduced property values 
suffered from noise pollution. The trend in cases declaring exclusive 
federal control of airport noise regulation, set by the Burbank 
preemption decision and followed in a flurry of state and local gov-
ernment cases subsequent to it,83 did not forewarn of this continued 
local liability in private property owner actions. In the Environmen-
tal Protection Agency [EPA] report of July 31, 1973, to the Senate 
.. Cooley v. Board of Wardens, 53 U.S. (12 How.) 143, 152 (1851). 
" E. g., preferential runway systems which limit populated area overflights, number and 
frequency of fleet landings, and take-off restrictions . 
.. 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 
(1975) . 
.. Village of Bensenville v. City of Chicago, 16 Ill. App.3d 733, 306 N.E.2d 562 (1973); 
Township of Hanover v. Town of Morristown, 135 N.J. Super. 529, 343 A.2d 792 (Super. Ct. 
1975). 
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Committee on Public Works, the administrator forecast a liability 
shift to the federal government collateral with its proclaimed 
preemption of airport noise control.64 Legal commentators made 
similar reasonable predictions of a liability shift.65 
The FAA apparently had recognized the risk of incurring the cost 
of noise damage and in 14 C. F. R.§36.5 issued an equivocal noise 
regulation standard that failed to set a noise ceiling for individual 
airports: " ... No determination is made, under this part, that 
these noise levels are or should be acceptable or unacceptable for 
operation at, into or out of, any airport." The FAA comment to 
accompany §36.5 explicitly stated that the responsibility for this 
determination remained with the proprietor of each airport.66 
These cases, predictions, and equivocations set the stage for 
Aaron, which presented an action in inverse condemnation by 
neighboring home owners against the city as proprietor of Los Ange-
les International Airport [LAX] to recover damages for the dimi-
nution of their property values due to airport noise. 
An action in inverse condemnation is based on the Fifth or Four-
teenth Amendment Due Process Clause or the Fifth Amendment 
Compensation Clause of the United States Constitution. It may also 
invoke similar, but sometimes broader, guarantees under the indi-
vidual state constitutionsY It involves a claim and proof that the 
governmental defendant took certain private property for public use 
without the procedures or just compensation required in an exercise 
of eminent domain. 
The California appellate court formulated the state rule govern-
ing recoveries in inverse condemnation as follows: 
The municipal owner and operator of an airport is liable for a taking or 
damaging of property when the owner of property in the vicinity of the 
airport can show a measurable reduction in market value resulting from 
the operation of the airport in such manner that the noise from aircraft 
using the airport causes a substantial interference with the use and 
enjoyment of the property, and the interference is sufficiently direct and 
sufficiently peculiar that the owner, if uncompensated, would pay more 
than his proper share to the public undertaking.88 
" EPA to Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., REPORT ON AIRCRAIT-AIRPORT 
NOISE 56-62 (Comm. Print 1973). 
" W. LAKE, Noise: Emerging Federal Control in FEDERAL ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 1150 (Envi-
ronmental Law Institute, 1974); Note, Federal Regulation of Aircraft Noise Under Federal 
Aviation Act, 15 B. C. IND. & COM. L. REV. 848 (1974); Note, Aircraft Noise Abatement: Is 
There Room for Local Regulation? 60 CORNELL L. REV. 269 (1975) . 
.. 34 Fed. Reg. 18355 (1969). 
" 3 NICHOLS, THE LAw OF EMINENT DOMAIN § 8.1[3] (3d rev. ed. Supp. 1975) . 
.. 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 483-84, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, 170 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419 
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The California rule is an assimilation of the legal history of com-
pensable constitutional "takings" of air easements by local airports 
over their neighbors' property which had been growing in federal 
and state courts for thirty years. 8U From these cases, two general 
profiles developed as to when and under what circumstances recov-
ery would be had. The federal courts followed a traditional trespass 
theory and required direct overflights or actual physical invasion of 
the superadjacent airspace for the property owner to recover. 70 The 
state courts tended to follow a nuisance theory and did not require 
proof of direct overflights. This approach was clearly set out by the 
Washington Supreme Court in Martin v. Port of Seattle: 
We are unable to accept the premise that recovery for interference with 
the use of the land should depend upon anything as irrelevant as 
whether the wing tip of the aircraft passes through some fraction of an 
inch of the airspace directly above the plaintiff's land. The plaintiffs are 
not seeking recovery for a technical trespass, but for a combination of 
circumstances engendered by the near-by flights which interfere with 
the use and enjoyment of their land.71 
In all cases, the owner and operator of the airport was held liable, 
not the federal government, even though a federal agency had set 
the standards, approved the plans and designs, and sponsored the 
construction or expansion of the airport.72 
Aaron held that no overflight requirement was necessary for re-
covery in California. The court cited the above passage from Martin 
to emphasize that such a requirement was arbitrary and unreasona-
ble. The requirement was found not scientifically sensible in an age 
U.S. 1122 (1975) . 
.. Compensable "takings" of air easements were at issue in Griggs v. Allegheny County, 
369 U.S. 84 (1962); United States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); City of Boston v. Massachu-
setts Port Authority, 444 F.2d 167 (1st Cir. 1971); Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580 (10th 
Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 955 (1963); Bennett v. United States, 266 F. Supp. 627 (W.D. 
Okla. 1965); City of Newark v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 159 F. Supp. 750 (D.N.J. 1958); 
Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178,376 P.2d 100 (1962); and Martin v. Port of Seattle, 
64 Wash.2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). 
7. E.g., Batten v. United States, 306 F.2d 580,584 (10th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 
955 (1963). 
71 64 Wash.2d 309,316,391 P.2d 540, 545 (1964), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 989 (1965). 
72 In Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84, 89 (1962), the Supreme Court denied an 
argument that the federal agency regulating aviation ratherthan the airport owner-operator 
was responsible for "taking" an air easement over neighboring property: 
The Federal Government takes nothing; it is the local authority which decides to build 
an airport vel non, and where it is to be located. We see no difference between its responsi-
bility for the air easements necessary for operation of the airport and its responsibility for 
the land on which the runways were built. 
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when accurate noise measurement technology is available. 73 Fur-
ther, it was not necessary under the state constitutional definition 
of a "taking" of private property. Unlike the narrow United States 
constitutional concept of the "taking" of property for public use by 
eminent domain, the California Constitution and Code of Civil Pro-
cedure broadened the state definition of compensable "taking" to 
include damaging or interfering with the use and enjoyment of prop-
erty.74 
The City of Los Angeles raised as a defense in Aaron the Burbank 
federal preemption of aircraft and airport noise regulation. The city 
contended that if the federal government had the right of exclusive 
control of airport noise, it must consequently bear sole liability for 
its resultant damage. The court denied this defense and held first 
that in terms of navigable airspace, the federal preemption of 
Burbank did not alter in any way the city's responsiblity as airport 
owner and operator to acquire the necessary land and air easements 
for safe aircraft approaches and take-offs.75 Consequently, the city 
would not be immune from liability for failure to make adequate 
appropriations and provisions. 78 Second, the court held that in 
terms of noise control, the federal preemption did not relieve a 
municipal proprietor of an airport of its traditional liability in in-
verse condemnation to neighboring property owners. The court built 
on the flaws in the reasoning of the Burbank decision (the equivocal 
legislative history and the exceptional limitation of the decision's 
application) to establish this unchanged municipal liability. 
The California court declared that the legislative history of the 
Federal Aviation Act of 1958 and the Noise Control Act of 1972 
revealed a Congressional intent to leave untouched the traditional 
73 The California court recognized that distinctions could be drawn between substantial 
and minimal interferences and thus proper damages and just awards could be determined. 
For a general discussion of the Noise Exposure Forecast System and compensation 
considerations, see CERCHIONE & SIMS, In Search of an Aviation Master Plan, in PLANNING, 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AVIATION 133 (A.B.A. 1974) and Van Alstyne, Just Compensation 
of Intangible Detriment: Criteria for Legislative Modifications in California, 16 V.C.L.A. L. 
REV. 491 (1969). 
,. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 14; CAL. CODE OF CIVIL PROC. §1239.3 (West 1972). 
15 "Navigable airspace" includes airspace necessary for safe airport approach and take-off 
paths, 49 V.S.C.A. §1301 (26) (Supp. 1975). 
" The California court cited the following "inverse condemnation" cases to underscore the 
city's responsibility and resultant fiscal liability: Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 V. S. 84 
(1962); Lorna Portal Civic Club v. American Airlines, Inc., 61 Cal.2d 582, 394 P.2d 548, 39 
Cal. Rptr. 708 (1964); City of Oakland v. Nutter, 13 Cal. App. 3d 752, 763 n.12, 92 Cal. Rptr. 
347,353 n.12 (Ct. App. 1970); Thornburg v. Port of Portland, 233 Or. 178,376 P.2d 100 (1962); 
and Martin v. Port of Seattle, 64 Wash.2d 309, 391 P.2d 540 (1964), cert. denied, 379 V.S. 
989 (1965). 
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areas of state and local government proprietary control and concom-
itantly the areas of local owner-operator liability.77 Burbank was 
limited by its note 1478 to a municipality's exercise of its police 
power and not its exercise of proprietary powers and the consequen-
tial liabilities it bore as owner and operator of an airport. 
The court indicated the city was not powerless, as it claimed, to 
control airport noise. As proprietor it could establish reasonable 
restrictions for airport use as in Port of New York Authority v. 
Eastern Air Lines, Inc. 79 and Stagg v. Municipal Court,80 or it could 
resort to the many options set forth in the California Public Utilities 
and Administrative Codes.81 
With this statement of alternatives available to the city, the 
Aaron court appeared to widen Burbank's note 14 distinction be-
tween the municipality in its exercise of police power and the mu-
nicipality in its exercise of proprietary rights. Port of New York 
Authority and Stagg were of questionable validity in 1974 after the 
Burbank preemption decision. Further, the California statutory re-
strictions and administrative regulations had been adopted after 
Burbank, were not scheduled to be fully effective until 1985, and 
were as yet unchallenged in the courts. But the California court's 
recommendations suggested the municipal proprietor's right, in 
theory, to exercise some control over the noise pollution for which 
it was now held liable. 
Cases subsequent to Aaron have defined and affirmed the munici-
pal proprietor's liability. For example, City of Los Angeles v. Japan 
Air Lines, CO.82 held, pursuant to a cross-complaint by Los Angeles 
against all the licensed airlines using LAX, that the city could not 
recover its disbursement in damages awarded in Aaron under a 
n Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App.3d 471, 489 & n.12, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, 174 & 
n.12 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975). To illustrate the equivocal nature of 
the legislative history, here the California appellate court, id., relied on S. REP. No. 1353, 
90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968) to demonstrate that local proprietary liability for noise dam-
age was unaffected by the Noise Control Act. This is the same Senate report on which the 
majority had relied in City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 634-35 
(1973) to establish a federal preemption of airspace management, and on which the dissent, 
id. at 648-50, had relied to deny the existence of a preemption. 
78 City of Burbank v. Lockheed Air Terminal, Inc., 411 U.S. 624, 635-36 n.14 (1973). See 
accompanying text at note 52 supra. 
71 259 F.Supp. 745 (E.n.N.Y. 1966), which allowed a system of preferential runway use to 
abate airport noise . 
.. 2 Cal. App.3d 318, 82 Cal. Rptr. 578 (Ct. App. 1969), which permitted an airport flight 
curfew to stand. 
" CAL. PUB. UTiL. CODE §21669 (West Supp. 1975); CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§5000-5080.5 (1975) . 
.. 41 Cal. App.3d 416, 116 Cal. Rptr. 69 (Ct. App. 1974). 
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theory of equitable indemnity.83 The airline-airport lease contained 
no provisions of indemnification for noise pollution damages; the 
liability rested ultimately with the city.84 
The dollar recoveries in these suits have made headlines85 but 
inverse condemnation alone is not an adequate remedy to airport 
noise pollution.80 The nearby property owners receive damages but 
no relief, the noise continues or worsens.87 The cities, operating on 
tight, if not deficit budgets, are plainly unable to absorb these enor-
mous demands for damages.88 Yet the air transportation industry 
and the FAA escape virtually unscathed and unpressured to reduce 
noise levels. 
III. FAA AND EPA REGULATION 
With few exceptions therefore, the local governments as proprie-
tors of the airports were to bear the fiscal responsibility for damages 
due to noise pollution, but the federal government was to make the 
rules to control and abate it. The legal assumption of effective fed-
113 The doctrine of equitable indemnity is applied when the conduct or occurrence is re-
moved by situs or subject matter from the provisions of a contractual indemnity. People ex 
rei. Dep't of Public Works v. Daly City Scavenger Co., 19 Cal. App.3d 277,281, 96 Cal. Rptr. 
669, 671 (Ct. App. 1971). But when the parties have expressly contracted to indemnify the 
conduct or occurrence in issue, the provisions of the contract are determinative and the 
doctrine of equitable indemnity may not be applied. Markley v. Beagle, 66 Cal.2d 951, 961, 
429 P.2d 129, 136, 59 Cal. Rptr. 809, 816 (1967). 
The airlines in City of Los Angeles v. Japan Air Lines Co., 41 Cal. App.3d 416, 428 & n.3, 
116 Cal. Rptr. 69, 77-78 & n.3 (Ct. App. 1974) had expressly contracted in the lease agreement 
to indemnify certain harm caused by aircraft take-offs and landings at LAX, but the lease 
provisions did not include damages resulting from noise pollution. The conduct, aircraft take-
off and landing, expressly covered in the contract was therefore dispositive and the doctrine 
of equitable indemnity would not be applied . 
.. See also Parker v. City of Los Angeles, 44 Cal. App. 3d 556,118 Cal. Rptr. 687 (Ct. App. 
1975), which granted recovery in inverse condemnation for diminution of private property 
values in another community contiguous to LAX . 
.. L. A. Times, Jan. 21, 1975, § II, at I, col. 1; L.A. Times, Jan. 26, 1974, § I, at I, col. 2 . 
.. Even Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 491, 115 Cal. Rptr. 162, 175 (Ct. 
App. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975) cautioned: 
Obviously a final solution to the problem will require numerous different approaches to 
it and the cooperation of airplane manufacturers, the airlines, federal, state and local 
government [footnote omitted]. 
See also Lesser, The Aircraft Noise Problem: Federal Power But Local Liability, 3 URB. LWYR. 
175 (1971). 
" Comment, Federal Preemption of Aircraft Noise Regulation and the Future of Proprie-
tary Restrictions, 4 N.Y. U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 99, 103 (1974) . 
•• Under the Airport and Airway Development Act of 1970,49 U.S.C. §§1701 et seq. (1970) 
[hereinafter AADA] some inverse condemnation fees may be reimbursable as "allowable 
project costs," 49 U.S.C. § 1720 (1970), if the airport was constructed or expanded under an 
AADA grant. 
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eral rule-making and enforcement was not, however, grounded in 
reality. 
Section 611 of the Federal Aviation Act as inserted in 19688D re-
quired the FAA to promulgate noise abatement regulations. There 
was not only a significant delay in the promulgation of these regula-
tions, DO but when finally issued the regulations addressed aircraft 
certification and not airport standards.D! By statutory directive, 
only those standards, rules, or regulations which were "economi-
cally reasonable, technologically practicable, and appropriate" were 
to be issued. D2 As a result the standards, rules, and regulations were 
remarkably lenient. Further, they contained many broad excep-
tions. They did not apply to military aircraft, supersonic aircraft, 
carriers in international commerce, or model types of carriers al-
ready in service when the regulation was issued. Consequently, the 
regulations covered less than 10% of the aircraft in service.D3 The 
woefully inadequate standards posed a harsh threat to the public 
health" ... that could have been prevented with stricter regula-
tions."D4 
But even if the regulations had been adequate, the FAA has a 
poor record of enforcement.D5 In Virginians for Dulles v. VolpeD6 the 
federal district court denied a citizens' class action for relief of noise 
at Washington National Airport but noted " ... a certain timidity 
on the part of the FAA in enforcing operational guidelines for the 
airlines at the airport, [the evidence showing] not a single instance 
of a pilot being disciplined for violations of a voluntary or regulatory 
limitation) .... "97 On occasion a court has compelled the FAA to 
.. 49 U.S.C. §1431 (1970), as amended, (Supp. III, 1973) . 
.. Sec. 611 was added by Pub. L. 90-411, §1, July 21, 1968; proposed regulations were 
published the following January, 34 Fed. Reg. 453 (1969); but final regulations were not issued 
until November, 34 Fed. Reg. 18364 (1969), to be effective December I, 1969. 
" NOISE STANDARDS, 14 C.F.R. § 36 (1975). Part 36 of the Federal Aircraft Regulations is 
often referred to as "FAR 36." 
.2 49 U.S.C. § 1431 (b)(4) (1970), as amended, 49 U.S.C. §1431 (d) (4) (Supp. III, 1973) . 
.. EPA to Senate Comm. on Pub. Works, 93d CONG., 1st Sess., Report on Aircraft-Airport 
Noise 31-32 (Comm. Print 1973). More recently R. Strelow, EPA ass't adm'r for Air & Waste 
Management admitted in an address before the annual meeting of the Airport Operators 
Council on October 21, 1975 in Puerto Rico that the forecasted noise reduction under FAR 
36 would not adequately protect health and welfare of the nation's city dwellers. 6 ENV. REP. 
CURRENT DEV. 1079 (1975). 
II Statement of Mathias Lukens, Pres., Airport Operators Council Int'I., N. Y. Times, Nov. 
16, 1969, § L, at 88, col. 2 (city ed.) . 
.. For an overview of FAA regulations and enforcement inadequacies see: Comment, 
Toward the Comprehensive Abatement of Noise Pollution: Recent Federal and New York 
City Noise Control Legislation, 4 EcoL. L.Q. 109 (1974); Comment, Port Noise ('omplaint, 6 
HARV. CIV. RIGHTS-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 61 (1970) . 
.. 344 F. Supp. 573 (E.D. Va. 1972). 
" Id. at 577. 
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abide by its own policies and regulations. A federal district court in 
City of Boston v. Coleman,98 enjoined the FAA from approving an 
airport layout plan until the agency complied with its own interim 
order that approval be conditioned upon an environmental review. 
Resort to court action for FAA enforcement, however, is expen-
sive, time-consuming, and not always successful. Although citizens' 
suits are authorized under the Noise Control Act,99 courts sometimes 
decline jurisdiction, particularly when promulgation and enforce-
ment of a specific regulation is discretionary with the agency under 
the Federal Aviation Act. IOO 
The new combination of the Environmental Protection Agency 
[EPA] with the FAA by the Noise Control Act in the federal 
scheme of aircraft-airport noise regulation was, at first, an encour-
aging sign. The general framework of the EPA is designed to center 
pollution control in one agency which does not have the additional 
and often conflicting task of encouraging development of an indus-
try.IOI But the EPA participation in noise control regulation is lim-
ited to a role as a compiler of studies and maker of recommendations 
and has been further reduced by severe agency budget cutS.102 The 
EPA has also been accused by certain Senators and environmen-
talists of "willful non-enforcement" of the Noise Control Act. 103 In 
fact, it was only in February, 1975, that the Administrator finally 
submitted the long-promised noise regulation recommendations for 
aircraft .104 The Agency is still reviewing airport noise control propos-
als. 
The slack in affirmative action by the EPA has not been taken 
up by citizen suits under the National Environmental Policy Act 
[NEP A] attacking airport noise pollution. These environmental 
.. City of Boston v. Coleman, Nos. 74-1781-S, 74-1798-S (D. Mass. July 18, 1975) . 
.. 42 U.S.C. § 4911 (Supp. III, 1973). 
'00 Corace v. Butterfield, No. 74-C-619 (E.D.N.Y. January 13, 1975). But see Illinois v. 
Butterfield, No. 74-C-2410 (N .D. Ill. June 13, 1975), which held that a federal court had 
jurisdiction to hear a noise pollution challenge to the proposed O'Hare Int'I Airport expansion 
under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321 et seq. (1970), the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551 et seq. (1970), and the federal question jurisdictional 
statute (28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970)). 
'0' 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (1970). 
102 A freeze on funding was offered as the reason for proposed regulation deferments by EPA 
Director Train, 5 ENV. REP. CURRENT DEV. 1053 (1974). The Senate and House threatened a 
complete cut-off of EPA funding under the Noise Control Act for the agency's failure to show 
any progress, but finally approved a short term extension of the EPA appropriations with the 
proviso that the Senate would begin EPA noise abatement oversight hearings. 5 ENV. REP. 
CURRENT DEV. 1835 (1975); 6 ENV. REP. CURRENT DEV. 1353 (1975). 
'03 5 ENV. REP. CURRENT DEV. 651, 946 (1974). 
10. 40 Fed. Reg. 8218 (1975). 
1976] AIRPORT NOISE REGULATION 115 
suits have generally failed either on their facts or because of NEPA 
loopholes. In Life of the Land v. Brinegar,105 the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals refused to enjoin a runway extension under construction 
at Honolulu Airport because the Environmental Impact Statement 
[EIS] projected a noise reduction rather than an increase through 
this diversion of approaches and take-offs. In Friends of the Earth, 
Inc. v. Coleman,106 the Ninth Circuit refused to enjoin construction 
of facilities expansion at San Francisco International Airport for 
lack of an environmental impact statement because the project was 
not totally federally funded. 107 Ventures with joint federal and local 
funding have escaped NEPA controls or delayed their application 
until environmentally preferable alternatives were no longer prac-
ticable.los 
One final hope for EPA leadership in airport noise control may 
have expired with the issuance of a recent directive by EPA Admin-
istrator Train.l09 Regulations were to be limited to those required by 
statute and tailored with acceptability to the regula tee in mind."o 
Regulations concerning noise pollution were specifically included in 
the list. 
The FAA, consistently, and the EPA, more recently, have failed 
to make adequate rules or even effectively enforce less-than-
adequate ones in the area of airport noise control. This failure is 
particularly bitter when it is remembered that the Supreme Court 
through all its obfuscation ultimately grounded the federal preemp-
tion decision in Burbank on evidence of agency preliminary action. 
One might wonder whether the finding would be the same today 
after three years of agency inaction. 
IV. TENTATIVE SIGNS OF FEDERAL/STATE/LoCAL GOVERNMENT 
COOPERATION: AIR TRANSPORT ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA V. CROTTI 
In February, 1975, in Air Transport Association of America v. 
Crotti, III a glimmer of hope for limited state and local regulation of 
airport noise, notwithstanding the federal preemption of "airspace 
management" was revealed. This case established that if the local 
'05 485 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U. S. 961 (1974). 
'0' No. 74-3490 (9th Cir., May 28, 1975). 
'07 Accord, City of Romulus v. County of Wayne, No. 74-72118 (E. D. Mich. March 31, 
1975). 
'0' Brown, Applying NEPA To Joint Federal and Non-Federal Projects, 4 ENV. AFF. 135 
(1975). 
1119 N.Y. Times, Sept. 28, 1975, at 1, col. 1 (city ed.). 
110 But see 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321, 4331 (1970), which declare the policy and purpose of NEPA 
in terms of the public's health and welfare, not in terms of an industry'S receptivity. 
"' 389 F. Supp. 58 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
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control were proprietary in nature, passive, and not in direct conflict 
with the preeminent federal scheme, it was not per se invalid. 
The action was filed by an association representative of virtually 
all licensed air carriers against the Director of Aeronautics for the 
State of California and several county and city officials in their role 
as operators of local airports. 1I2 The suit, brought before a three-
judge federal district court, challenged the constitutional validity 
of California aircraft and airport statutes and administrative regu-
lations. The court declined to abstain, although the case required a 
determination of state law, since the plaintiff's contention and the 
ultimate issue involved the federal preemption doctrine of Burbank. 
The statutes in question directed the California Department of 
Aeronautics to promulgate noise regulations to govern the operation 
of California airports and the aircraft using those airports. liS Viola-
tions of the regulations by aircraft operators would carry misde-
meanor sanctions and would be enforced by the local counties. Vio-
lations by airport operators would carry the risk of temporary or 
permanent loss of essential state operating permits. 
The challenged implementing regulations,1I4 in turn, detailed the 
objective of gradual reduction of airport noise under two headings: 
1) Community Noise Equivalent Level [CNEL]1I5 which prescribed 
the maximum airport noise profile to be achieved by December 31, 
1985, for continued airport operation, the monitoring and measure-
ment techniques to scrutinize noise levels, and some suggested 
means of reducing these noise levels which were available to local 
operators;1I8 and 2) Single Event Noise Exposure Levels [SENEL], 
which prescribed the maximum individual aircraft noise emission 
level for carriers in flight and were specifically addressed to the 
problem of sonic booms. 
The state thus set required noise limits and issued suggested 
means of compliance which were available to the local owner-
operators. The power of the state to regulate its political sub-units 
is well-settled and a local airport authority can reasonably be con-
112 The United States, representing in particular the interests of the FAA and the EPA, 
appeared as amicus curiae. 
113 CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§ 21669-69.4 (West Supp. 1975). 
'14 CAL. ADMIN. CODE §§ 5000-80.5 (1975). 
II. CNEL level is based on actual monitoring data, uses the decibel unit [dB], measures 
noise levels of separate events and the frequency of events each day and night against certain 
normalizing constants. For a general introduction to CNEL and other noise level description 
systems see CERCHIONE & SIMS, In Search of an Aviation Master Plan, PLANNING, 
ENVIRONMENTAL SCIENCE, AVIATION 133 (A.B.A. 1974). 
II. Methodology for Controlling and Reducing Noise Problems, CAL. ADMIN. CODE § 5011 
(1975). 
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sidered one of those political sub-units. 117 That the state and not the 
municipality set maximum noise levels does not alter the right of 
the local authority to issue certain regulations to reduce its airport 
noise and not to issue others.1I8 The question to be decided was, 
what are legitimate local regulations and what are not? 
The court in Air Transport held the SENEL regulation was per 
se invalid. SENEL, the court stated, was an unlawful attempt to 
exercise local government police power to control aircraft in flight, 
a control which had been declared federally preempted in Burbank. 
The court, however, held that the CNEL regulations were not per 
se invalid but apparently a lawful attempt to exercise local govern-
ment proprietary powers to mitigate consequent damages for which 
it was ultimately liable. As to the CNEL regulations, ". . . the 
Airlines' total reliance upon Burbank [was] misplaced. "119 
Alluding to the presumption favoring constitutional validity of 
state statutes and regulations,120 and mindful of the legal and fiscal 
reality of an airport proprietor's responsibility for noise pollution, 121 
the court of appeals built once more on what have been identified 
as the flaws in reasoning of the Burbank decision to reach its conclu-
sion of the validity of the CNEL regulations. Concerning the stated 
reliance in Burbank on legislative history, the court cited the same 
Senate report used by the majority and the dissent in Burbank to 
deny the existence of an intention by Congress to alter fed-
eral/state/local power relationships in the area of proprietorship 
control.t22 The lack of Congressional intent was further evidenced by 
the FAA's failure to set definitive noise levels for individual air-
ports. 123 Concerning the stated limitation of the Burbank holding, 
which included a municipality's exercise of its police power to con-
trol aircraft flight, but expressly excluded a municipality's exercise 
117 City of Trenton v. New Jersey, 262 U.S. 182, 185-87 (1923); Trans World Airlines, Inc. 
v. City & County of San Francisco, 228 F.2d 473, 477 (9th Cir. 1955). 
118 Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 63-64 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
"' Id. at 63. 
120 Id. The court cited a series of cases premised on this presumption: Flemming v. Nestor, 
363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, 359 U.S. 520, 524 (1959); Davies 
Warehouse Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 144, 153 (1944); Davis v. Department of Labor & Indus., 
317 U.S. 249, 257 (1942); and South Carolina State Highway Dep't v. Barnwell Bros., 303 
U.S. 177, 191 (1938). 
121 Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1975). The court 
cited the inverse condemnation cases Griggs v. Allegheny County, 369 U.S. 84 (1962); United 
States v. Causby, 328 U.S. 256 (1946); Aaron v. City of Los Angeles, 40 Cal. App. 3d 471, 
115 Cal. Rptr. 162 (Ct. App. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1122 (1975); and by reference all 
the state court precedents relied on in Aaron. 
122 Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 64 (N.D. Cal. 1975) citing S. 
REP. No. 1353, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 6-7 (1968). See note 77 supra. 
"" 14 C.F.R. § 36.5 (1975). 
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of its proprietary power as owner-operator of an airport, the court 
declared in unequivocal terms: ". . . [W]e take as gospel the words 
in footnote 14 in Burbank. . . . "124 
A tone of praise for the state's airport noise control efforts 
generally underlay the Air Transport opinion and specifically prem-
ised the CNEL holding. 125 The CNEL requirements for monitoring 
and measuring noise levels were justified "passive" functions of 
local operators which were "innocuous to aircraft traffic. "126 The 
CNEL suggestions for land and facilities use and development were 
unmistakably within the bounds oflocal control. 127 Only § 5011 (d), 
a curfew restriction overly reminiscent of Burbank Municipal Code 
§ 20-32.1, appeared suspect to the court. 
In summarizing its position the court contracted the breadth of 
its holding. It reserved jurisdiction to determine whether those regu-
lations which were valid on their face, once implemented, would 
also be valid in effect. The requirements and regulations, in fact, 
might prove to be "unrealistic, arbitrary and unreasonable," "an 
abuse of police powers" or an undue "burden on interstate and 
foreign commerce."128 The bounds of each of the CNEL regulations 
would not be considered hypothetically, but would be determined 
later in actuality when their implementation was under way. Thus 
not only was a decision on these specific regulations postponed but, 
more significantly, a specific enumeration of the municipal proprie-
tor's powers to control airport noise was also delayed. 
CONCLUSION 
How far can a municipal proprietor go to abate the airport noise 
for which it will be held financially responsible? After Air Transport 
the question still has not been fully answered. The outer limits of 
permissible regulation by a municipal proprietor have been set out, 
but determinations of the validity of intermediate controls have not 
been made. 
A municipal proprietor can monitor and measure airport noise 
levels. But airport noise data is of little use if subsequent controls 
can not be applied to reduce those levels, if noisier jets can not be 
banned or at least assessed landing fees proportionate to the noise 
,24 Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
'" The court identified the legislation as: " ... a commendable progressive state· 
sponsored effort toward the future safety and protection of its citizenry from the ever increas· 
ing aircraft produced noise nuisances." [d. at 62. 
'20 [d. at 64. 
'%7 [d. at 65. 
'" [d. 
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generated, if number and frequency of flights can not be determined 
and reworked with the carriers, or if towing can not replace excessive 
taxiing. 
The municipal proprietor of an airport can not sanction excessive 
noise emissions, specifically sonic booms, of aircraft in flight. But 
whether it can prescribe a system of preferential runway use for 
take-off's and landings over its less inhabited periphery or require a 
series of operational procedures to limit the expanse of noise pollu-
tion is still unresolved. 
Air Transport or a similar challenge arising in another state may 
reach the United States Supreme Court for review and a definitive 
statement of a municipal proprietor's powers may then be had. 128 A 
blanket exclusion of all local proprietary controls similar to the 
federal preemption over police power controls in Burbank would be 
straightforward but tragic if the FAA and EPA continue their inade-
quate regulation and enforcement procedures. l30 An alternative of 
case-by-case review of local regulations in the courts or before re-
gional FAA-EPA panels would be slower but ultimately fairer to the 
airport owner-operator and more satisfactory to its neighbors. De-
terminations then would be of specific and actual conflict with fed-
eral law, not general presumptive fiat based on an overbroad 
preemption finding. They would be based on the problems of an 
individual airport and its periphery. 
Burbank would not have to be discredited. The limitation of note 
14 would simply have to be taken "as gospel"131 and not as an uncer-
tain disclaimer. It would also be read as a limitation on a kind of 
121 The three-judge federal district court in Air Transport granted partial summary judg-
ment on the SENEL regulations but reserved jurisdiction pending further implementation 
of the CNEL regulations. The parties have exchanged a new series of interrogatories and the 
next step appears to be a trial at that level before an appeal can be taken to the Supreme 
Court. (Jan. 12, 1976 conversation with Lawrence King, Sacramento, Cal., counsel for defen-
dant.) 
Legislation similar to the California airport noise control laws has been enacted or at least 
filed in several states, including Illinois, Minnesota, New York, and Pennsylvania. AIRCRAIT/ 
AIRPORT NOISE STUDY - TASK GROUP 1 REpORT, Legal & Institutional Analysis of Aircraft 
& Airport Noise & Apportionment of Authority Between Federal, State and Local Govern-
ments 41, 43 & n.l90 (NTID 73.2, July 1973); and 23 COUNCIL OF STATE GOVERNMENTS, 
Suggested State Legislation 10-21 (1974). Individual airport operators, including the Mass. 
Port Authority, have proposed or instituted noise level restrictions for their airports. MASS. 
PORT AUTHORITY, Draft Master Plan for Logan International Airport 16-32 (Jan. 1976). Court 
challenges may arise from any of these or other noise abatement attempts. 
130 The enormous physical, psychological, and economic damages due to aircraft/airport 
noise would only be compounded. Today, greater than 12% of the population of the United 
States (over 16 million people) are adversely affected by this noise. 6 ENV. REP. CURRENT 
DEV. 1079 (1975), quoting EPA ass't adm'r Roger Strelow. 
\31 Air Transport Ass'n of America v. Crotti, 389 F. Supp. 58, 63 (N.D. Cal. 1975). 
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action and not merely a category of airport ownership. The Burbank 
preemption of noise control regulations governing aircraft flight 
under the Federal Aviation Act and the Noise Control Act would 
ultimately be sustained by recognition of the need for a uniform 
system for practical and safe functioning of air commerce, not by 
reliance on a selective and unpersuasive legislative history. Airport 
land and facilities use, however, would be subject to proprietary 
restrictions. The proprietary restrictions could not be unreasonable, 
discriminatory, unduly burdensome on interstate commerce or in-
consistent with "airspace management." 
EPA Assistant Administrator Strelow recently introduced a possi-
ble third alternative: federal regulations which would include par-
ticipation of the airport operator in the preparation of noise profiles 
and constraints for each airport. 132 This alternative would be similar 
to a case-by-case review for direct conflict in its individual airport 
consideration but would be more advisory than adversarial. Again 
it must be remembered that under the Noise Control Act the EPA 
can make only recommendations, not final promulgations, of regu-
lations. 133 In light of past performance it is questionable whether 
ultimate FAA restrictions would have any substance or effect. Per-
haps the increased threat of local legislation and litigation would 
provide the incentive necessary to overcome that agency's former 
lenience in regulation making and reticence in regulation enforcing. 
132 This alternative was introduced in the Assistant Administrator's October 24, 1975 
address to the Airport Operators Council in Puerto Rico, 6 ENV. REp. CURRENT DEV. 1079 
(1975). 
133 E.g., 42 u.S.C. § 4906 (Supp. ill, 1973). 
